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PHOTO ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS: ARE
THEY PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION?
PAUL MCNAUGHTON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU'... sort of.' After all,
this is the United States, not Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, or
Oceania, the fictional world created by George Orwell in his
renowned novel 1984.2 Nevertheless, aspects of Orwell's
technological world are creeping into American society.3 The
state's use of automated cameras to enforce traffic laws is a casein-point.4 And though not equivalent in degree to the intrusive
state action of Orwell's Oceania, it is equivalent in kind.5 Unless
checked, this type of state action will have lasting repercussions on
an individual's right to interstate travel and personal privacy.
This Comment will consist of three parts: enactment,
enforcement, and interpretation of photo enforcement statutes.
The first part, enactment, will provide a brief historical
background of photo enforcement programs, explain the policy

* Thanks to everyone who helped create this Comment, including my
professors, editors, student-peers, and my support-group at home, especially
my wife and parents, whose patience was instrumental in bringing this
Comment to fruition.
1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 2 (Signet Classic 1992) (1949).
2. Id. at 3.
3. See generally Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2321, 2324 (2007) (discussing different categories of surveillance-based
technology, including "cameras, wireless sensor networks, networked devices
incorporating location data, and tools for information sharing and
aggregation").
4. See Governor's Highway Safety Association, Speed and Red Light
Camera Laws, http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfollaws/autoenforce.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (stating that as of March 2010, twenty-four states
and the District of Columbia have some type of automated enforcement
program in operation); Kevin P. Shannon, Note, Speeding Towards Disaster:
How Cleveland's Traffic Cameras Violate the Ohio Constitution, 55 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 607, 610-13 (2007) (summarizing the different types of photo
enforcement-including red-light, speeding, and toll-the technology that each
respective system employs, and how the programs work).
5. See generally ORWELL, supra note 1 (describing the "telescreen" as a
device used, similar to photo enforcement cameras, to ensure that citizens
were not violating state laws).
463
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arguments for and against them, and extrapolate the most
common aspects and distinctions from existing photo enforcement
statutes. The second part, enforcement, will focus on executive
discretion in the photo enforcement context, analyzing how it
differs both from state-to-state and from traditional police
enforcement methods. The final part, interpretation, will survey
past challenges to photo enforcement statutes, identify the
successful and unsuccessful arguments, and propose a new way to
constitutionally attack the use of photo enforcement programs.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Introduction to Automated Camera Laws: Brief Historical
Background, Policy, and Analysis of Existing Photo
Enforcement Statutes

Photo enforcement technology has been in use internationally
for approximately forty years.6 Despite its popularity abroad, the
United States has only embraced the idea of photo enforcement
within the last ten years.7 Most jurisdictions in the United States
that have experimented with photo enforcement have done so in
the limited context of pilot programs.8 Some states that have
introduced the photo enforcement pilot program have proceeded to
implement full-fledged photo enforcement programs, 9 while others
have gone the opposite direction, substantially curtailing their
use10 or, in some cases, eliminating photo enforcement entirely."
6. PhotoCop, Violating Traffic Laws is a Snap!, http://www.photocop.com

(last visited Mar. 10, 2010). More than forty-five countries worldwide have
utilized automated cameras to enforce their traffic laws. Id.; see also
Shannon, supra note 4, at 611 (noting that as many as seventy-five countries
have attempted photo-enforcement technology to enforce their laws).
7. See PhotoCop, supra note 6 (stating that concerns over public reaction
to photo enforcement is principally responsible for the hesitancy of many state
and local governments to proceed with passing enabling laws). Other concerns
include the technology's accuracy, cost, intrusiveness, and legality. Id.
8. April Lynch, AZ Expands Highway Speed Program w/ Redflex,
OFFICER.cOM, Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.officer.com/publication/printer.
jsp?id=42623 (announcing that the Arizona Department of Public Safety
recently completed a nine-month pilot program along Arizona Highway 101,
utilizing photo enforcement technology to catch speeders).
9. Arizona Department of Public Safety, Photo Enforcement Program Arizona Department of Public Safety, http://www.azdps.gov/safety/
photoenforcement/default.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2010); see also Lynch,
supra note 8 (reporting that on July 18, 2008, Arizona announced that it
would expand the pilot program and implement the nation's largest speed
enforcement system along a major highway, consisting of 200 cameras).
10. See Dan Harrie, PhotoCop: Utah Supports New Variation, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Dec. 24, 1997, at Al (explaining that Utah did not completely ban photo
enforcement but restricted it to school zones, effectively ending its use).
11. See Danielle Stanton, ADP Takes Up Where Photo Radar Leaves Off,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 20, 1997, at 1A (explaining that Alaska
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As with any new technology, there are those for and against
using photo enforcement programs. Proponents argue that photo
enforcement programs reduce speeding violations, red-light
violations, accidents, and accident severity.12 Additionally,
supporters claim that photo enforcement technology enforces
traffic laws in an objective manner.1 3 Moreover, supporters argue
that using this type of program allows police officers to dedicate
more time toward enforcing other, potentially more important,
laws. 14 Finally, advocates point to the revenue producing benefits
of using photo enforcement.1 5
Opponents argue that photo enforcement programs are
inaccurate, intrusive, unnecessary, and a waste of taxpayers'
money.16 Moreover, critics question the technology's effectiveness
as a safety measure, arguing that the data provided by various
pilot programs implemented across the United States is
inconclusive on the question of accident reduction.17 Similarly,
suspended its program because of its ineffectiveness in deterring speeding, its
failure to generate revenue, and its overall unpopularity among the public).
Neither Alaska nor Utah has made any plans to reinstitute photo enforcement
in their states.
12. See Lynn Bryant, Photo Enforcement of Traffic Laws - Sifting Through
the Opinions Surrounding This Current Trend, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE GUIDE,
Feb. 15, 2008, http://www.video-surveillance-guide.com/photo-enforcement-oftraffic-laws.htm (citing studies conducted by the Department of Transport in
England that have shown that, since the implementation of photo enforcement
programs, there has been a fifty-five percent reduction in speed violations and
a forty-five percent reduction in severe accidents).
13. Thomas M. Stanek, Comment, Photo Radar in Arizona: Is It
Constitutional?, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1209, 1216 (1998) (stating that the camera
does not care what color your skin is, what your gender is, or how much money
you have; if you are speeding, you will be cited).
14. Id. at 1217.
15. See Frank Main, Say Cheese, Speeders, CHICAGO SUNJ-TIMES, Aug. 7,
2008, at 6 (discussing Chicago's argument that the technology's revenue
raising capabilities could directly fund the creation of an "elite tactical team"
of police officers, further contributing to the enhanced safety of the roads and
the community in general).
16. See PhotoCop, supra note 6 (citing the growing caseload as an
additional factor that both militates against the policy underlying photo
enforcement, contributing to the high cost of its implementation); see also
National Motorist's Association, Ticket Cameras: Red Light Cameras and
Photo Radar, http://www.motorists.org/photoenforce (last visited Mar. 10,
2010) (listing the many objections to photo enforcement programs, including:
(1) ticket recipients are not adequately notified of their violation of a traffic
law; (2) the driver of the vehicle is not positively identified when the alleged
violation is deemed to take place; (3) ticket recipients are not notified quickly;
(4) there is no certifiable witness to the alleged violation; (5) ticket camera
systems do not improve safety and are enacted primarily for their revenueproducing benefits; (6) taking dangerous drivers' pictures does not stop those
instances of dangerous driving; and (7) radar technology is still inaccurate).
17. See Del Quentin Wilber & Derek Willis, D.C. Red-Light CamerasFail to
Reduce Accidents, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2005, at Al (presenting evidence that
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many argue that photo enforcement programs do not do enough to
prevent the primary causes of accidents: speeding and red-light
violations.' 8 Finally, some critics argue that the traffic congestion
created by the technology is more burdensome than any safety
benefits derived from its use.19
As of March 2010, twenty-one states and the District of
Columbia have passed legislation enabling some kind of photo
enforcement. 20 Many of these statutes restrict the way in which
photo enforcement programs may be implemented. 21 Of all the
states that have red-light camera or speed camera monitoring,
California's program is by far the most restrictive, incorporating
many procedural safeguards to ensure fairness to both the driver
and registered vehicle owner.22
Not every state, however, affords the same level of protection
to drivers. For example, although states like California and
Arizona require that a driver receive reasonable notice that he or
she is approaching a photo enforcement zone, 23 not every
intersections in Washington, D.C., utilizing red-light cameras have increased
incidences of traffic accidents); see also Shannon, supra note 4, at 608
(commenting on a Washington Post study that revealed that intersections
where red-light cameras are in effect have seen an increase in the number of
traffic accidents and an eighty-one percent increase in injuries and fatalities
as a result of those accidents); Bryant, supra note 12 (arguing that a study by
Safe Speed indicates not only that red-light cameras increase the rate of traffic
accidents, but also that such programs are responsible for the hindrance of
good driving habits, mainly, paying more attention to speed than
surroundings).
18. PhotoCop, supra note 6 (acknowledging that "[t]aking a reckless driver's
picture does not stop that incidence of reckless driving.").
19. See id. (highlighting studies that find an increase in traffic congestion
as a result of the implementation of photo enforcement programs because of
the aforementioned hindrance to good driving habits and increase in rear-end
traffic collisions); see also National Motorist's Association, supra note 16
(arguing that red-light cameras discourage the synchronization of traffic
lights, which further contributes to traffic congestion); Bryant, supra note 12
(citing a study conducted in South Wales that revealed that thirty percent of
speed cameras in that region had either no effect or increased the number of
traffic accidents).
20. Governor's Highway Safety Association, supra note 4. Other photo
enforcement programs operating within the states are expressly authorized by
"home-rule" jurisdictions of that state. Id.
21. These elements include: (1) signs that indicate that a photo enforcement
program is in operation; (2) warning periods during which citations may not be
issued, proceeded by public announcements that photo enforcement programs
are in effect; (3) limitations on nongovernmental bodies in the administration
and operation of photo enforcement technology; (4) mandated consistency in
the administration and maintenance of the systems in operation; and (5)
guidelines for preserving the confidentiality of photographic records. CAL.
VEH. CODE § 21455.5 (West 2008).
22. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (laying out the limitations on
how the government may utilize photo enforcement in California).
23. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 21455.5(a)(1) (requiring that the governmental
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jurisdiction is so generous. 24 Additionally, some jurisdictions, such
as Washington, D.C., authorize their government to contract with
private companies to not only purchase and install cameras, but
also to administer and operate the technology.25 Unlike other
jurisdictions, Washington, D.C., does not allow the alleged violator
to authenticate his or her "mug shot" prior to paying the fine;
instead, the registered owner is presumed to have violated the
law. 26 Similarly, in Texas, the registered owner of a vehicle cited is
fined unless he or she can show that the vehicle had been leased,
transferred, or stolen before the violation occurred. 27 In Chicago,
the registered owner is automatically liable, even if he or she can
prove that he or she was not driving the car at the time of the
violation. 28 This "innocent owner" problem is exacerbated if, as in
a number of jurisdictions, criminal penalties attach to the
violation, such as the assessment of points against one's driving
record. 29
Automated photo enforcement programs also differ among
jurisdictions in the permissible subject matter of the photograph.
agency "identif[y] the system by signs that clearly indicate the system's
presence and are visible to traffic approaching from all directions, or posts
signs at all major entrances to the city, including, at a minimum, freeways,
bridges, and state highway routes"); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-654(B)
(2008) ("At least two signs [must] ... be placed in a location before a photo
enforcement system. One sign shall be in a location that is approximately
three hundred feet before the photo enforcement system. Placement of
additional signs shall be more than three hundred feet before a photo
enforcement system to provide reasonable notice to a person that a photo
enforcement system is present and operational").
24. See PhotoCop, supra note 6 (discussing New York City's photo
enforcement program, which employs what is known as a "stealth program,"
where drivers are given no advance notice that cameras are in operation in a
particular area).
25. D.C. CODE § 50-2209.03 (2008) (authorizing the mayor to "enter an
agreement with a private entity to obtain relevant records regarding
registration information or to perform tasks associated with the use of an
automated traffic enforcement system, including, but not limited to, the
operation, maintenance, administration or mailing of notices of violations").
Contra CAL. VEH. CODE § 21455.5(a)(2)(c) (authorizing "[o]nly a governmental
agency, in cooperation with a law enforcement agency, [to operate] an
automated enforcement system.").
26. Shannon, supra note 4, at 616.
27. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 370.177 (2007) (operating in the limited
context of deterring toll violations, as distinguished from a red-light or speed
enforcement context).
28. See Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 6085, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933,
at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2008) (discussing the Chicago ordinance that
establishes liability for the registered owner of the vehicle in all cases, except
where the registered owner is a licensed lessor of vehicles, and there is a
formal contract with the lessee of the vehicle in question).
29. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-654 (2008) (establishing that a violation
may result in the assessment of points against the responsible party's driving
record).
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While some states allow automated camera systems to photograph
a vehicle from any point of view, other states only permit the
camera to photograph the license plate, presumably to lessen the
intrusiveness of the technology. 30
Finally, photo enforcement statutes sometimes prescribe and
prohibit particular types of photo enforcement.3 1 For example,
some jurisdictions allow cameras to be placed on local roadways
but not state highways, or vice versa. 32 As of March 2010, nine
states expressly prohibit some or all photo enforcement programs
from operating in their states. 33
B. Introduction to the Enforcement of Automated Camera
Laws: Differences from TraditionalPolice Enforcement
There are several major pre-citation differences between
photo enforcement and traditional police enforcement of traffic
laws. 3 4 The first difference is the ability and ease with which the
driver's identity is established. Unlike traditional police
enforcement, where a police officer can verify a driver's identity
simply by checking a driver's license, photo enforcement has no
means of identifying the driver either at the moment the photo is
taken, or when the citation is processed. 35 This shortcoming has
resulted in states imposing liability on the registered owner of the
vehicle, regardless of whether that person was driving the car at
the time of the violation.36 Second, the systems differ in the police
officer's ability to exercise discretion in a given instance.3 7 Finally,
30. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 228.058 (2007); see also WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.63.160(7)(a) (2008) (limiting the photo taken by automated cameras to
the rear license plate of vehicles).
31. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-654(B) (2008) (prescribing both speed
and red-light monitoring systems in the state). Contra TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 370.177 (2007) (prohibiting speed monitoring systems in the state).
32. See City of Commerce City v. Colorado, No. 01SC281, 2002 Colo. LEXIS
140, at *8 (Colo. Feb. 11, 2002) (discussing the primary distinction in the use
of photo enforcement in different jurisdictions within Colorado, mainly on the
types of roadways-e.g., heavy arterials or light connectors-this technology
can be used).
33. Governor's Highway Safety Association, supra note 4 (listing Arkansas,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin as states that prohibit some or all photo enforcement
in their state).
34. See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, DiscretionlessPolicing: Technology and
the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199 (2007) (summarizing the
benefits and burdens of a so called "discretionless" method of police
enforcement through the use of technology similar in style to photo
enforcement).
35. Id.
36. See National Motorist's Association, supra note 16 (identifying the
cause and effect of the "innocent owner" problem).
37. See id. (pointing out that police officers can readily determine whether
there is an exigent circumstance making it necessary to violate a traffic law,
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enforcement systems differ because the violator is not stopped in
the context of a photo enforcement program.38
The post-citation operation and administration of photo
enforcement is different as well. Under a typical photo
enforcement program, processing a citation begins with a
partnership between the governing jurisdiction and a private
contractor that manufactures and installs the cameras.3 9 Some
states, such as California, have statutes that prohibit private
companies, like Redflex, from being involved in the actual
administration, maintenance, and operation of a photo
enforcement program. 40
Other states have no such restriction and allow private
contractors to be intimately involved in every aspect of an
enforcement program, from the manufacturing of the camera to
sending out the citations. 41 Most jurisdictions that permit this sort
of arrangement pay private contractors on a contingency fee basis,
awarding them a certain percentage of the fine. 42 The typical photo
enforcement process, from the taking of the picture to the issuance
of the citation, is described in detail in the Arizona State Senate
Issue Brief.43
while cameras generally cannot, leaving the owner of the registered vehicle in
the unfair situation of having to spend the time and money to rebut the
presumption that he or she violated the law or assert an affirmative defense
for so doing).
38. See id. (arguing that the absence of a stop means that "dangerous
drivers" keep on driving).
39. See Lynch, supra note 8 (identifying typical bidders for the job, such as
Red Flex, who is the "largest provider of digital red light and speed
enforcement services in North America").
40. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21455.5(c) (authorizing "[o]nly a governmental
agency, in cooperation with a law enforcement agency, [to operate] an
automated enforcement system").
41. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (identifying Washington,
D.C., as a jurisdiction that allows commingling of the government and a
private contractor in the photo enforcement process).
42. See In re Red Light Photo Enforcement Cases, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413, 419
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008), review granted, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37 (2008) (discussing the
use of various types of contingency fee agreements entered into by Lockheed
Martin and a number of jurisdictions within California).
43. Arizona Senate Research Staff, Issue Brief: Photo Traffic Enforcement,
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/briefs/Senate/PHOTO%20TRAFFIC%20ENFORC
EMENT.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). Once a violation occurs, the camera
takes a picture or a series of pictures from different angles, including the
license plate and the driver. Id. Those photographs are stored on a hard drive
and are eventually uploaded and maintained in an electronic government
database. Id. Next, the operator sifts through the pictures, identifying the
license plates and matching them with the registered owner(s) of the vehicle.
Id. Afterward, the operator mails (to the police department or directly to the
responsible party depending on the statute) the "notice of violation" containing
information including, the time and date of the traffic violation, the pictures
documenting the same, and the vehicle and registered owner's information.
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C. Introduction to the Court's Interpretationof Automated
CameraLaws: Successful and Unsuccessful Challenges
As photo enforcement programs have continued to increase in
popularity over the past ten years, they have faced numerous legal
challenges. The most heavily litigated aspect of photo enforcement
statutes has been the presumption that the registered owner of a
vehicle is liable for the violation. 44 Many critics argue that this
presumption violates a vehicle owner's Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process4 5 and Equal Protection rights. 46 These challenges
under both state and federal laws have been wholly unsuccessful.47
Another common challenge to photo enforcement programs is
that local jurisdictions lack the authority to enact ordinances
permitting photo enforcement or, even if they do, are preempted by
state law. 4 8 Although this preemption argument has been
successful in invalidating local photo enforcement laws in some
jurisdictions,4 9 procedural due process claims, on the other hand,
are highly individualized, and the majority of courts have found no
denial of notice or a hearing.5 0 Drivers have also argued--to no
Id. Commonly, the "notice of violation" will include a space titled "affidavit of
non-responsibility," where the registered owner can declare that he or she was
not driving the car at the time the violation occurred, or some other
circumstance existed that justified the violation. Id. For example, citations
issued to drivers running red lights to make room for emergency vehicles or to
keep in line with funeral processions will be waived. If responsible for the
violation, upon return of the "notice of violation," the jurisdiction will file a
complaint against the offender in its local court. Id. The jurisdiction will then
send the offender a summons to appear and a copy of the complaint and traffic
ticket. Id. In lieu of appearing, the jurisdiction typically offers the defendant
a variety of options, including payment of a fine, assessment of points against
the defendant's driving record, or attendance at traffic school. Id.
44. See Williams v. Redlex Traffic Systems, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22723, at *12-13 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008) (discussing that the
statutory presumption that the registered owner is driving the vehicle at the
time of the violation may impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the
defendant).
45. Id. at *13 (arguing that it is fundamentally unfair to shift the burden of
proof onto the defendant to rebut the allegation of a criminal violation).
46. City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)
(discussing the argument that the law violates equal protection because it
creates an impermissible classificatory basis between drivers and registered
vehicle owners by "afford[ing] a greater degree of protection to the guilty
driver than the innocent vehicle owner").
47. Id. at 332-33. This decision indicates that a state has broad authority
to regulate pursuant to its police power, and consequently no complainant has
the "right" facts to viably argue that the photo or red-light statutes should be
subject to anything other than the highly deferential rational-basis review.
48. City of Commerce City v. Colorado, No. 01SC281, 2002 Colo. LEXIS
140, at *8 (Colo. Feb. 11, 2002) (holding that local ordinances were superseded
by a conflicting state statute).
49. Id.
50. Idris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933, at *26 (focusing on whether the
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avail-that the partnership agreement between the governing
jurisdiction and the private corporation is void as a matter of
public policy. 5' Similarly, taxpayer waste claims have been
equally ineffective.5 2
Whether a photo-enforced citation assesses a civil fine or a
criminal penalty is integral to a complete assessment of a driver's
rights. Most photo enforcement statutes provide that any fines
assessed pursuant to a violation of a traffic law are civil in
nature.53 But just because a fine is denominated as "civil" does not
necessarily mean it is. For example, in City of Knoxville v. Brown,

the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a court must look to the
nature of the fine to determine whether a citation is a criminal
penalty. 54 Although state law determines whether a fine is
criminal, it is clear that the assessment of points against one's
driving record is generally considered a criminal penalty.55
The significance of this distinction cannot be overstated.
Once a fine is deemed a criminal penalty, the offender is entitled
to assert all of his criminal procedure rights-including the right

interest in public safety outweighs any burdens that stem from the
technology's use). Specifically, the court held that the statutory scheme
enabling photo enforcement did not violate due process because "the benefits
of the truncated procedure outweighed its costs." Id. In other words, the
limited process a party is entitled to in the administration of a photo
enforcement citation is justified given the relative insignificance of the
property interest at stake. Id.
51. See In re Red Light, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 419 (pointing to the potential for
conflicts of interest, as well as corruption as a result of the financial
arrangements inherent in these partnerships). But see Leonte v. ACS State &
Local Solutions, Inc., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 879, 883-84 (implying that photo
enforcement systems in which the state is not "ultimately the system
operator" would be void as a matter of public policy). Whether the state is
"ultimately the system operator" depends on whether the state "retains the
right to oversee and control the functioning of the system." Id.
52. See In re Red Light, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 425-26 (stating the general rule
that "[a] taxpayer waste cause of action will not lie where the challenged
governmental action is legal."). Photo enforcement statutes are reviewed with
a strong presumption of validity under the United States Constitution. Idris,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933, at *19.
53. See, e.g., Brown, 284 S.W.3d at 337 (involving a state statute imposing
a civil fine on traffic violations); see also TENN. CODE. ANN. § 55-8-110 (Supp.
2007) (stating that a violation under the Tennessee photo enforcement statute
is a civil violation and may not be considered a moving violation or recorded
against the driving record of the owner).
54. 284 S.W.3d at 337 (quoting the United States Supreme Court statement
that "[t]he notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across
the division between the civil and the criminal law.)" The court held that "civil
proceedings may impose sanctions that are 'so punitive in form and effect' as
to trigger constitutional protections." Id.
55. See id. at 338 (concluding that where a sanction is imposed that is
"intended to be punitive and a deterrent, [then] constitutional protections are
triggered").
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to confrontation, right against self-incrimination, right against
double jeopardy, etc.-in an attempt to defeat the claim.56 Given
the breadth of constitutional protections that attach in this
context, it is easy to see why many governing jurisdictions forego
the assessment of fines that could be construed as a criminal
penalty. Undoubtedly, in the criminal context, it will not be as
easy for the state to shift the burden of proof to the innocent
registered owner or withhold notice and hearing requirements in
the face of a procedural due process claim.57
III.
ANALYsis
Given the distinctions in the way photo enforcement
legislation is promulgated, administered, and litigated, the
constitutional attacks will begin with an argument against the
validity of a California-like statute, with significant procedural
safeguards to violators. At appropriate junctures, this Comment
will point out how distinctions from a California-like statute may
tilt the analysis in favor of or against the constitutionality of the
statute.
A. Photo Enforcement Statutes Violate the FundamentalRight
to Travel Protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the FourteenthAmendment
Photo enforcement statutes are unconstitutional because they
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by unduly burdening U.S. citizens' right to interstate
travel.58 Although there is no mention of the right to travel in the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment, it has long been recognized by
the Supreme Court as a fundamental right.59 In Saenz v. Roe, the
Court used the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth

56. See id. (finding that constitutional protections were invoked due to the
nature of the fine involved).
57. Although interesting questions are raised here, it is not the purpose of
this Comment to address the highly particularized circumstances in which
these constitutional rights will be successful in thwarting a photo-enforced
traffic violation. Instead, this Comment seeks to address the constitutionality
of photo enforcement programs in general and thus will presume, unless
noted, that the violation of a particular photo enforcement statute imposes a
mere civil penalty, rather than any criminal penalties.
58. The Fourteenth Amendment states, "No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
59. See generally The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849)
(invalidating a tax on non-residents arriving from foreign ports). See also
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 25, 43-44 (1867) (holding that taxes on
railroads and stage coaches for transporting passengers out-of-state were
unconstitutional because they impermissibly interfered with citizens' rights of
free access).
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Amendment to protect the fundamental right to travel,60 despite
its virtual non-use since the Slaughterhouse Cases essentially read
it out of the Constitution.6 1
Because the successful invocation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause is relegated to right
to travel cases-and even then only since 1999 when Saenz v. Roe
was decided-there has been limited opportunities for courts to
consider claims under this clause. 62 As a result, the test for
determining what constitutes an infringement of the right to
travel under the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause remains uncertain. There is support, however,
for the proposition that right-to-travel cases will be adjudicated by
using the "levels of scrutiny" test applied in Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection cases. 63 Before
reaching that point, however, the Court must make a preliminary
finding, based on the plaintiffs showing that a particular case or
controversy implicates the fundamental right to travel;64 then
strict scrutiny will likely apply.6 5

1. Photo Enforcement Statutes Impose a Tax on Interstate
Travelers Found Unconstitutionalin Crandall v. Nevada
The Supreme Court has found the right to travel applicable

60. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999). The Court identified three
aspects of the right to travel protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) the right of a citizen of the United
States to enter and leave any state, regardless of residency; (2) the right of
that citizen to "be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly
alien" when temporarily visiting another state, and (3) the right of that citizen
to be treated the same as a resident of the state in which he chooses to reside,
regardless of how long he resides there. Id.
61. See generally The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)
(severely limiting the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges
and Immunities Clause).
62. See generally id. (refusing to apply the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges or Immunities Clause to invalidate a monopoly over the
slaughterhouse business on the basis that it violated the affected parties' right
to practice their trade). But see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178
(1941) (Douglas, J., concurring) (recognizing, along with three other justices,
the right to travel under the Fourteenth Amendment's Privilege or
Immunities Clause).
63. Before the Court resurrected the Privileges or Immunities Clause in
Saenz, right-to-travel cases were decided predominately under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and their "levels of
scrutiny" test. See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 419 (1981) (discussing that if
the state establishes a compelling interest in burdening the right to travel,
then the law will generally be upheld).
64. Id.
65. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (noting that the court will defer to the legislature unless there is
infringement of a fundamental right).
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in the context of durational residency requirements.6 6
when the law distinguishes between residents and nonunder residency requirements, the law is deemed not to
the citizens' right to travel.6 7 This difference is

encapsulated by Justice Brennan in Attorney General of New York

v. Soto-Lopez.6 8 Because photo enforcement statutes, upon first
glance, are not directly analogous to durational residency
requirements, another justification must be found to make the
right to travel applicable in evaluating the constitutionality of a
photo enforcement statute.
Such a justification is found in the earliest cases recognizing
the right to interstate travel. Particularly instructive is Crandall
v. Nevada, where the Nevada legislature imposed a tax on all
transportation businesses taking people across state lines. 69 The
Supreme Court struck down the tax as an unconstitutional
violation of a citizen's fundamental right to travel. 70
Photo enforcement programs enact the type of tax that was
declared unconstitutional in Crandall.71 There are three factual
differences to which critics of this position will point. First, they
will argue that photo enforcement programs do not automatically
tax citizens who cross state lines. There must be a violation of
local law before the "tax" is imposed. Second, they will argue that
photo enforcement programs treat in-state and out-of-state

66. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637-38 (1969) (finding that
waiting-period requirements on welfare benefits to new residents clearly
burdened the right to travel because it treated established residents
differently). As a result, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the legislative act.

Id.
67. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 (1983) (holding that
residency requirements do not burden the constitutional right of interstate
travel because any person may choose to migrate to a state and establish
residency there).
68. 476 U.S. 898, 903 n.3 (1986) (expressing that the Court has "always
carefully distinguished between bona fide residence requirements, which seek
to differentiate between residents and nonresidents, [and residence
requirements] such as durational, fixed date and fixed point residence
requirements, which treat established residents differently based on the time
they migrated to the state").
69. Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 36. In Crandall, the Nevada legislature
enacted a law requiring the tax of every person leaving the state by way of
railroad, stage coach, or "other vehicle engaged or employed in the business of
transporting passengers for hire," payable by the proprietor of the service. Id.
at 35.
70. Id. at 43-44 (holding that a citizen has a free right of access, and "this
right is in its nature independent of the will of any State whose soil he must
pass in the exercise of it").
71. See infra pp. 478-81 and notes 74-75 (refuting the counter-arguments
that differences between the tax in Crandall and photo enforcement have
constitutional significance, and characterizing the state action in each case as
indistinguishable under the Constitution).
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residents the same, unlike the tax in Crandall, which
discriminated only against citizens leaving the state. Finally, they
will argue that photo enforcement programs do not burden
interstate travel differently than what is already permissible,
pursuant to a state's police power.
a.

Factual Differences Between the Tax in Crandalland
Photo Enforcement Programs Are Not Constitutionally
Distinct

The fact that photo enforcement programs require a violation
of law before the "tax" is imposed does not turn the constitutional
analysis on its head. As Justice Stevens noted in Saenz, the right
to travel encapsulates the right not only to travel freely from stateto-state, but also to be treated as a "welcome visitor," rather than
an "unfriendly alien" in that state. 72 The right to travel is clearly
invoked when automated cameras seek to capture every vehicular
indiscretion throughout an interstate trip, especially when photo
enforcement programs are still not used in many areas throughout
the United States.73 This is a particularly harsh reality in itself,
let alone when dealing with a stealth photo enforcement program,
as is employed in New York City.74 Regardless of the type of photo
enforcement statute, the fact that a photo enforced "tax" is not
assessed until the law is violated is irrelevant in light of Justice
Stevens' second test in Saenz because an all-seeing camera makes
travelers feel like "unfriendly aliens." 75
72. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 (identifying the second test used in determining
whether there has been a violation of the fundamental right to travel).
73. Governor's Highway Safety Association, supra note 4 (identifying that
almost half of the states in the country have no photo enforcement programs
operating anywhere in their state).
74. See PhotoCop, supra note 6 (discussing New York City's photo
enforcement program, which employs what is known as a "stealth program,"
where drivers are given no advance notice that cameras are in operation in a
particular area). When a non-resident's state has no photo enforcement
program in place, and such a non-resident is traveling in another state that
provides no notice that photo enforcement is the primary method of enforcing
traffic laws, citation by photo enforcement may result in a due process
violation for lack of notice and will unduly interfere with the non-resident's
right to travel. Id. This scenario clearly fails Justice Stevens' second test in
Saenz in that interstate travelers may not be treated as "unfriendly aliens" in
non-resident states because they have not received general notice of the
implementation of photo enforcement that inures to residents simply by living
and working in the state for a period of time. Cf Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502.
Photo enforcement statutes of this kind, under these circumstances, create de
facto durational residency requirements in violation of the fundamental right
to travel.
75. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502. Under Saenz, the right to travel is unduly
burdened where the right of the citizen to "be treated as a welcome visitor

rather than an unfriendly alien" while temporarily visiting another state is
Id. This sentiment is exacerbated in the context of photo
violated.
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b. Bringing Photo Enforcement Squarely Under Crandall:
Photo Enforcement Programs Constitute de facto
Durational Residency Requirements Invalidated Under
the Saenz Right to Travel Analysis
Supporters may further argue that both residents and nonresidents are equally affected by automated cameras when
traveling throughout a particular state. Such an assertion ignores
reality.76 Although the law does not expressly set out to burden
travel by non-residents, it has the effect of doing so because of the
nature of photo enforcement programs. Essentially, photo
enforcement statutes create a de facto durational residency
requirement 77 because, in most cases, the programs are set up at
fixed locations, and residents learn precisely where the cameras
are located within a short period of time. Therefore, residents can
avoid the burdens that automated cameras create. This is not the
case for non-residents, and the result is an increased incidence of a
photo enforced "tax" for non-residents. This result is impermissible
under Justice Stevens' third test in Saenz78 and brings photo
enforcement squarely under Crandall in that the tax does not
treat residents and non-residents the same.
c. The Use of Photo Enforcement Programs Penalizes
Migration by Denying Citizens the Right to Have Police
Officers Administer Laws
As to the final contention, that photo enforcement does not
burden the right to travel more than it is already permissibly
burdened through traditional police enforcement, it is important to
keep in mind that the respective systems are fundamentally

enforcement because almost half of the citizens have never been subject to its
use. Governor's Highway Safety Association, supra note 4 and accompanying
text (stating that half the states and their residents have no experience with
photo enforcement). Furthermore, it is of no significance under Saenz that
local law must be violated before the tax is assessed. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 507.
This argument is particularly persuasive where a state uses photo
enforcement to enforce its laws, because, like the invalid tax in Crandall,it is
the tax-assessing mechanism (the photo enforcement program), and not
necessarily the tax itself, that makes non-residents feel like "unfriendly
aliens" while traveling across state lines.
76. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502. It also ignores Justice Stevens' third test
implicating the right to travel in Saenz: whether the state abridges the right of
the citizen to be treated the same as a resident of the state in which he
chooses to reside, regardless of how long he resides there. Id.
77. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining why photo
enforcement programs are akin to durational residency requirements and thus
violate the right to travel).
78. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 (describing the third test of the right to
travel as the right of "newly arrived citizens [to enjoy] the same privileges and
immunities enjoyed by citizens of that state").
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different.79 Whether these distinctions make a constitutional
difference in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause depends upon a qualitative analysis of the
burdens that photo enforcement creates for motorists above and
beyond traditional police enforcement.80 In Soto-Lopez, the
Supreme Court invalidated a durational residency requirement
that provided hiring preferences for veterans based on whether
they were a resident of the state when they enlisted in the armed
forces.8 1 In his holding, Justice Brennan noted that "even
temporary deprivations of very important benefits and rights can
operate to penalize migration."82
The use of photo enforcement programs operate to deny
citizens the right to have police officers administer local laws. 83
79. See Photocop, supra note 6 (explaining the policy arguments against
photo enforcement of traffic laws); see also National Motorist's Association,
supra note 16 (listing the policy arguments against photo enforcement of
traffic laws); supra Part II (outlining the differences in the enforcement of
traffic laws).
80. It is a generally accepted fact that the states, through their power to
enact legislation to promote public health, safety, morals, and welfare, have
authority under the Constitution to statutorily enable police officers to enforce
traffic laws. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (discussing
police power generally and the right to enact legislation to enforce police
powers); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 386-88 (1926)
(establishing the framework by which a statutory enactment is to be
scrutinized by the courts). However, photo enforcement differs from police
enforcement both in degree and in kind. National Motorist's Association,
supra note 16 (detailing the differences between photo enforcement and
traditional police enforcement of traffic laws). Whether the differences have
constitutional significance depends on the extent to which the two types of
enforcement differ, and specifically, whether the negative characteristics of
photo enforcement alter the analysis under the "levels of scrutiny" test. To
that end, it will only be clear to what extent photo enforcement can
permissibly interfere with the citizen's right to interstate travel upon
assessing the burdens that accompany its use. See Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (employing a similar "undue burden" test
inheres for assessing the extent to which the state can permissibly interfere
with the right to an abortion before viability). The situations are comparable
because in each case the government is attempting to restrict a fundamental
right. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (finding that a woman's decision
to terminate her pregnancy falls under those personal rights that are deemed
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
81. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 911.
82. Id. at 907.
83. Although it is a general proposition that allocation of police resources is
a state, as opposed to a federal concern, several states have fostered a belief
that motorists should have the benefit of a police officer to explain away the
violation, to utilize his discretion in issuing a warning, and to resolve any
confusion that may arise from a potentially complex situation. See Photocop,
supra note 6 (discussing issues that the use of photo enforcement programs
create). As previously mentioned, almost a third of the states in the union
have no form of photo enforcement operating anywhere in their state.
Governor's Highway Safety Association, supra note 4. There are only twenty-
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Within that framework, citizens are deprived of all of the benefits
that traditional police enforcement methods have over photo
enforcement, including the possibility of communicating with the
law enforcement agent in attempt to mitigate guilt and avoid
liability for the fine. 84 Also, within that framework, citizens are
saddled with all of the burdens of photo enforcement (that are
avoided by traditional police enforcement), including the
administrative problems that arise from the inability to identify
the driver, contest the citation before its issuance, and the
vehicle's registered owner's presumption of guilt.85 Chicago-like
photo enforcement statutes, which presume the guilt of the
registered owner of the vehicle even where "affidavits of nonresponsibility" are signed, are particularly susceptible to more
exacting scrutiny by the courts because they supplant traditional
police enforcement procedures with their own. By doing so, these
statutes deprive citizens of important rights, which unduly
burdens interstate travel.8 6 A qualitative analysis of the burdens
of photo enforcement makes it clear that, at the very least, photo
enforcement programs create a distinct and new obstacle for
travelers, particularly non-residents, and, consistent with SotoLopez,87 should implicate the right to travel for purposes of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

one states and the District of Columbia that expressly authorize photo
enforcement in their state. Id. The other photo enforcement programs that
exist are spread sporadically across the nation, many merely taking the
technology out for a test-run. Id. Nine states have rejected all or specific
types of photo enforcement technology. Id. As such, photo enforcement
technology has not been widely embraced across the nation, and non-residents
are in for a truly rude awakening when traveling interstate and subjected to
technology with which residents have already had a chance to become
accustomed, without any comparable benefit to non-residents, nor any notice
that the benefit of traditional police enforcement is suspended.
84. See Photocop, supra note 6 (explaining the policy arguments against
photo enforcement of traffic laws); see also National Motorist's Association,
supra note 16 (listing the policy arguments against photo enforcement of
traffic laws).
85. See Photocop, supra note 6 (identifying additional problems caused by
automated cameras).
86. See Idris, No. 06 C 6085, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933, at *4-5
(discussing a Chicago ordinance that automatically assumes that the
registered vehicle owner violated the traffic law).
87. Photo enforcement programs implicate the fundamental right to travel
because, like the durational residency requirement in Soto-Lopez, photo
enforcement establishes a de facto durational residency requirement on nonresidents by denying "the very important benefit" of having police officers
administer local laws, through the use of technology with which many nonresidents are unfamiliar. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 907.
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2. Photo Enforcement Statutes Are Not Necessary to
Accomplish a Compelling Government Purpose
Infringements on fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny.8 8
Therefore, a state must establish that photo enforcement
programs are necessary to accomplish a compelling government
purpose.89 Conceding that public safety in general, and specifically
the safety of our roadways, presents a compelling purpose, photo
enforcement statutes must nonetheless fail under strict scrutiny
because they are not necessary to effectuate that purpose. Under
the least restrictive alternative test,9 0 the safety of our roadways
can be preserved through other equally effective means, including
increasing the number of patrolling squad cars, utilizing speed
trailers, and increasing education for defensive driving. The
burdens that photo enforcement programs impose on interstate
travel do not justify its use, especially where other equally
effective programs accomplish the same goal without negatively
affecting a citizens' right to travel.

B. Photo Enforcement Statutes Violate the Right of
Individuals to Control InformationAbout Themselves,
Protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment
Photo enforcement statutes are unconstitutional because they
impermissibly infringe upon citizens' privacy rights, specifically
the right to control information about oneself, as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 9 1 The modern
revival of so-called substantive due process has been responsible
for the constitutional protection of many rights that, up until this

88. See id. (discussing the strict scrutiny standard used when fundamental
rights are involved).
89. See Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (noting, inter alia, that
the court will defer to the legislature unless there is infringement of a
fundamental right). Footnote four in Carolene Products Co. implies but does
not reach the conclusion that in certain circumstances, such as where there is
''prejudice against discrete and insular minorities," or restrictions of
fundamental rights, government conduct will be subject to "a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry." Id.
90. The least restrictive alternative test is used where strict scrutiny
applies to the government's conduct in a Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
and Immunities Clause case. See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,
470 U.S. 274, 285 (1978) (holding that the means by which the government
sought to accomplish its objective were not necessary). Thus, if a court
identifies a way in which the state could have carried out its purpose with less
onerous effect on individual rights, then the government's conduct at issue
fails the least restrictive alternative test. Id.
91. The Fourteenth Amendment states, "[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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point, were not recognized by the Constitution.92 Contrary to the
economic rights protected by substantive due process in the
Lochner-era, however, so called privacy or autonomy rights are the
ones that receive the most protection under modern day
substantive due process.93
1. The FourthAmendment Does Not Protect Victims of Photo
Enforcement from Privacy Invasions Because No Search or
Seizure Occurs
The Fourth Amendment, like modern day substantive due
process, has long protected the privacy rights of citizens of the
United States, and, at first glance, it may look to provide a
significant amount of protection in the photo enforcement
context. 94 However, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with
respect to the protection of an individual's privacy rights in his
automobile has afforded scant protection. In Carroll v. United
States, the Supreme Court first recognized a constitutionally
protected privacy interest in an automobile.9 5 The case, however,
also recognized an "automobile exception" to the general rule that
searches should be conducted pursuant to a warrant.9 6 Later, in
California v. Carney, the Supreme Court noted that the
"automobile exception" did not rely solely on the "mobility" factor
identified in Carroll, but also upon the reduced expectation of
privacy with respect to one's automobile.9 7 So long as searches and
92. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the right to
purchase and use contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the right
to abortion); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (the right to
keep the family together); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990) (the right to refuse treatment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (the right to sexual autonomy).
93. In fact, other than impingements on long-recognized fundamental
rights, like the right to travel, the Court has only subjected to heightened
scrutiny state action that impedes long-recognized privacy or autonomy
interests of an individual. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (listing
fundamental "privacy" rights).
94. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
95. 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (holding that there is a protected privacy
interest in an automobile under the Constitution, but the ready mobility of the
vehicle means that it is afforded a lesser degree of protection than stationary
objects or structures).
96. Id. at 162.
97. 471 U.S. 386, 391-93 (1985) (holding that there is a reduced expectation
of privacy in automobiles because of the amount of regulation that vehicles are
subject to, especially in comparison with one's home).
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seizures of automobiles are based upon probable cause, they are
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.9 8
Before reaching the question of probable cause, however, it
must be established that the use of photo enforcement programs
constitutes a search or seizure.9 9 To that end, the plaintiff must
show that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area
searched or the item seized by the cameras. 0 0 In United States v.
Knotts, the Supreme Court held that "[a] person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place to another."' 0'
Although the Supreme Court in Carroll established that there is
an expectation of privacy in one's automobile, current Fourth
Amendment law seems prepared to recognize an individual's
privacy interests in his automobile as reasonable only where the
vehicle is parked within the "cartilage" of the home.102 The use of
automated cameras to photograph drivers, although intuitively
intrusive to privacy interests of the individual, does not invoke the
protections of the Fourth Amendment because no search or seizure
has occurred. 03
98. Carrol, 267 U.S. at 162. Additionally, in United States v. Ross, the
Supreme Court further tightened its grip on an individual's privacy rights
with respect to automobiles. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824
(1982) (extending the automobile exception to include searches and seizures,
without a warrant, of closed containers located within an automobile, so long
as the search is limited in scope to areas in which probable cause as to a
particular thing inheres).
99. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
100. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (noting that there is a two-step requirement for determining the
protection afforded to individuals with respect to a place: (1) "that a person
ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and (2) that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable").
101. 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (holding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in that which is exposed to public view).
102. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 472 (1971) (holding that
the seizure of an automobile parked outside the suspect's house was
unreasonable without the initial procuring of a warrant because none of the
concerns with flight of the suspect were present, and the car's close proximity
to the house created a stronger expectation of privacy than if the car had been
seized while on the road).
103. As an aside, if under unique circumstances an individual successfully
argues that her reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated by a photo
enforcement program, the far more interesting question is whether the state
has probable cause to search or seize the thing over which the reasonable
Photo
expectation lies.
The answer, almost invariably, must be no.
enforcement programs are limited by the technology with which they are
programmed (detecting red-light, speeding, or toll violations). With regard to
police enforcement, mere red-light, speeding, or toll violations do not give rise
to probable cause to search and seize the vehicle without more. See Stanek,
supra note 13, at 1240-41 (explaining that photo enforcement programs do not
Thus, automated cameras have
implicate fourth amendment concerns).
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2. Photo Enforcement Statutes Are UnconstitutionalUnder
Justice Steven's Right to Privacy Analysis in Whalen v. Roe
Returning to the substantive due process argument
introduced above, the fundamental liberty right at issue here is
essentially the individual's right to control his or her own personal
information. Where an individual travels in his automobile, his
appearance, his personal belongings, and the need to be free from
the state capturing all of the above on its cameras, justifies the
need for protection against photo enforcement invasions of privacy
under substantive due process. 104 In Whalen v. Roe, the Court
declined to recognize the right to control personal information as
fundamental under the Due Process Clause where the state
maintained a database of computer files listing the names and
addresses of patients that were prescribed drugs with the
potential for abuse.105 Significantly, Justice Stevens, for the
majority, held out the possibility of recognizing, as fundamental,
the right to control personal information under the Due Process
Clause, given the threat inherent in the compilation of
considerable amounts of personal information in government
databases.106

Although no constitutional right to control personal
information was recognized under the due process clause in
Whalen, a challenge to the constitutionality of photo enforcement
programs provides the perfect opportunity to reconsider that
result for three reasons. First, unlike Whalen, which dealt only
probable cause to search or seize only that which would indicate that a redlight, speeding, or toll violation has occurred. Id. The difference is that police
officers are not limited in the way that photo enforcement is, because the
former have the ability to interact with the driver, use their police training,
and utilize their senses to determine whether something is amiss that gives
the officer probable cause to conduct a search or seizure of the automobile.
This is not so with photo enforcement. Thus, unless the search or seizure
relates to the underlying action giving rise to probable cause (in these cases
evidence of a red-light, speeding, or toll violation), the search or seizure will
almost invariably be a violation of the driver's Fourth Amendment rights.
104. Like the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause
argument above, courts will only invalidate photo enforcement statutes if they
are subject to heightened scrutiny. Once again, heightened scrutiny applies
only where there is discrimination against a "discrete and insular minority,"
or where there is infringement of a fundamental right. CaroleneProducts, 304
U.S. at 152 n.4. A right is fundamental if it is "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition." Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
105. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977) (holding that disclosure of
private medical information is an important part of a medical practice, and the
mere fact that disclosure may cast the patient in a negative light as a past
drug abuser does not amount to an unconstitutional invasion of privacy).
106. See id. at 605 (stating, in pertinent part, that "the enforcement of
criminal laws requires the orderly preservation of great quantities of
information, much of which is personal in character and potentially
embarrassing or harmful if disclosed").
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with the intrusiveness of the database itself, photo enforcement
programs are highly intrusive even before any personal
information is entered into a database. 0 7 Second, Whalen was
decided in 1977; thirty years later, the potential for privacy
intrusion via technologically advanced surveillance equipment has
increased exponentially; photo enforcement programs are only one
example.108 Third, unlike the database in Whalen,109 photo
enforcement programs have been notorious for compilation errors
and disclosure flaws in the administration of the databases"o
because photo enforcement programs cannot identify the driver of
107. Photo enforcement has the capability of monitoring where you go, who
you're with, what you are wearing, and what is in your car. Although patients
must first disclose information to their doctors prior to its entry into a
government database, this system of disclosure is much less intrusive than
photo enforcement "disclosures" for two reasons.
First, disclosures to
physicians are voluntary. Second, disclosures to physicians are confidential.
Although the physicians in Whalen were required by law to disclose (to the
database) information about prescriptions given to their patients that have the
potential for abuse, the disclosures remained accessible only by "doctors,
hospital personnel, insurance companies, and public health agencies." Id. at
602. On the other hand, photo enforcement "disclosures," depending on the
enabling statute, may be accessible by the general public simply by filling out
a Freedom of Information Act request. See Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D) (1996):
Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available
for public inspection and copying . . . copies of all records, regardless of
form or format, which have been released to any person under
paragraph (3) and which, because of the nature of their subject matter,
the agency determines have become or are likely to become the subject
of subsequent requests for substantially the same records.
Agencies may refuse disclosure if "specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute." Id. § 552(b)(3). There is also a broad exception to the general rule of
disclosure for "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or
information could, [inter alia], reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Id. § 552(b)(7)(C). Regardless of
the particular exception invoked, the burden is on the government to justify
withholding the requested document, not the requesting party. Id. § 552(b).
Without a statutory provision exempting disclosure, as in the California
statute, it is easier for the government to simply disclose than to use up
precious time and resources arguing that the request falls under one of the
exceptions.
108. See generally Werbach, supra note 3 (discussing technology expansion
in the last few decades).
109. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06 (discussing that a different situation
would be before the Court if evidence of unwarranted disclosures of personal
information were present, or if the database itself did not contain security
provisions that rendered it free from compromise).
110. See Bryant, supra note 12 (noting that the inability of photo
enforcement to identify the driver, the concomitant burden of placing the
burden on the innocent driver to clear the ticket, and the commonly cited
shortcoming that tickets are frequently lost or severely delayed, all add to the
flawed ticketing process that photo enforcement programs employ).
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the automobile and therefore hold a vehicles' registered owner
responsible for the violation. 1 1 This makes it difficult for the
registered owner to control his or her personal information, since
not even the state knows whose information is in its database. 112
Disclosing sensitive personal information is one thing, but
disclosing sensitive, inaccurate information is quite another.
Compilation flaws are also prevalent in photo enforcement
programs because of the unreliability of the system itself.
Individuals are sometimes ticketed for forces beyond their control,
including malfunctioning of the particular photo enforcement unit,
following in a funeral procession, maneuvering to avoid emergency
vehicles, or car theft.113 These incidences all add to compilation
anomalies that preclude individuals from exercising their right to
control information about their personal lives and which provide
support for the argument that the right to control information,
first raised in Whalen, now has a much stronger leg upon which to
stand.
IV.

PROPOSAL

Although photo enforcement statutes should be held
unconstitutional, courts will incur several barriers in invalidating
these statutes. If courts are able to invalidate these laws, this
Comment proposes other, more effective alternatives to using
automated cameras. However, if courts are unable to invalidate
these statutes, then states should implement procedural
safeguards to ensure that a driver's rights are protected.
A. Barriersto Photo Enforcement Statutes' Complete Repeal
by States and Localities Where They Are in Effect
1. Separation of Powers
Photo enforcement is bad policy. 114 This assertion alone,
111. See Photocop, supra note 6 (explaining the policy arguments against
photo enforcement of traffic laws); see also National Motorist's Association,
supra note 16 (listing additional policy arguments against photo enforcement
of traffic laws).
112. This situation is exacerbated in "home-rule" jurisdictions subject to
Freedom of Information Act requests by parties seeking disclosure of photo
enforced violations. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996)
(laying out the general rule of disclosure); see also supra note 107 and
accompanying text (discussing the lack of incentive for local government to do
anything but disclose).
113. See Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A. 2d 181, 186 (D.C. 2009) (noting that while
there are some statutes that provide for exceptions based on funeral
processions, emergency vehicles, and reported stolen cars, there are others
that do not).
114. See National Motorist's Association, supra note 16 (listing the many
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however, even if capable of a black and white determination, does
not make photo enforcement unconstitutional. In a democratic
society, policy decisions reflected in law must be determined
through the political process, not the courts. Thus, in the context
of construing a state photo enforcement law under the U.S.
Constitution, the role of the courts must be limited to determining
whether the state statute violates a provision of the Constitution.
Carrying out that role necessarily requires balancing two
competing interests. Courts must be careful to respect their
traditional role under our system of checks and balances by
deferring to the legislature on matters of policy. But, equally
important, courts must not abrogate their responsibility to uphold
the Constitution in doing so. Thus, although photo enforcement
may be bad policy, courts can invalidate statutes only if they
offend constitutional principles.
Invalidation of statutes restricting the exercise of
fundamental rights upon strict judicial review does not raise
serious separation of powers concerns.115 Of course, the separation
of powers issue can be wholly avoided if the legislature repeals the
statute itself. Although, as mentioned before, some jurisdictions
have done exactly that, 116 others have been blinded by the
revenue-making capabilities of photo enforcement and will
continue to "milk the system" until it is politically inexpedient to
do so. For the time being, it is unlikely that state and local
government will repeal their own photo enforcement statutes.
Therefore, the fate of photo enforcement lies with the courts.
Because making and enforcing traffic laws has traditionally been a
police power reserved to the states, a federal court decision
interpreting the Constitution to forbid photo enforcement raises
important questions of federalism.
2. Federalism
The virtues of federalism are numerous and varied. Principal
among them is the idea that different states have different

objections to photo enforcement programs).
115. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (holding that government
action which restricts the exercise of a fundamental right is subject to a
heightened form of judicial review). Because the right to interstate travel and
the right to control information are fundamental liberties, courts have broad
authority to scrutinize the constitutionality of government actions interfering
with their use. Id. It is unlikely that a separation of powers problem will
emerge in this context.
116. See Stanton, supra note 11 (explaining that Alaska suspended its
program because of its ineffectiveness in deterring speeding, its failure to
generate revenue, and its overall unpopularity among the public); see also
Harrie, supra note 10 (explaining that the Utah legislature did not ban photo
enforcement completely, but restricted it to school zones, effectively ending its
use).
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problems that require different techniques to solve them. A federal
ban on a particular method of accomplishing an important state
interest fails to adequately consider the magnitude of the problem
or the method's success rate in any given jurisdiction. It is clear
that a federal court decision declaring photo enforcement
unconstitutional would subvert principles of federalism.
Nonetheless, such a decision is required because photo
enforcement severely undermines the historical rights to privacy
and travel that this country has provided, and because the states
have at their disposal numerous, equally effective, alternatives for
dealing with the problem of traffic safety.' 17 For these reasons, the
use of photo enforcement technology to enforce traffic laws should
be abolished."18 There are a number of alternative safety measures
that are just as effective at reducing red-light, speed, and toll
violations, but without the negative side-effects of photo
enforcement.
B. Solutions to the Problem of Photo Enforcement (Other Than
117. Another reason a federal ban on photo enforcement programs is in the
nation's best interests, despite its subversion of our federalist system, is
because this kind of technology represents a slippery slope. Every time a court
upholds the use of a new, privacy depriving technological contraption (like
photo enforcement) on the grounds that it meets rational basis review, an
individual's travel and privacy rights are eroded, and the precedents set make
it harder and harder to reverse the course. For this reason, a court must
apply heightened review of laws that utilize travel or privacy-restricting
technologies that are not sufficiently narrowly tailored. The challenge of
photo enforcement technology under the Constitution is the last best chance to
reverse the course of unbridled legislative power to enact liberty-depriving
laws, reviewed with unthinking deference by the courts.
118. Pragmatically, some drastically limited form of photo enforcement
which neither burdens individual privacy nor interstate travel rights would be
ideal. Government authorities that have implemented photo enforcement
have done so at great public expense, and a complete ban on its use would
likely cost the public a substantial sum of money. See Steven T. Naumchik,
Stop! Photographic Enforcement of Red Lights, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 833,
848-49 (1999) (stating the high costs associated with photo enforcement
cameras in California). Although the cameras are in most cases leased from
the private contractor, the administrative and start-up costs of
implementation would be difficult to recover and not easily translatable to
other government uses. Id. Although monetary concerns are important, they
are subordinate to concerns of privacy and travel rights. At the very least, any
system employing automated cameras should be programmed to preclude
capturing certain subject matter, including the vehicle itself, the driver, the
passenger, and any other intimate details of the vehicle's interior. Essentially
anything apart from the vehicle's license plate should be precluded.
Additionally, no penalties, either civil (monetary) or criminal (points) should
Finally, the
attach for a violation of a photo enforcement program.
confidentiality of the violations should be preserved for all but the most
These safeguards would adequately and
exceptional circumstances.
constitutionally serve the interests of personal privacy and interstate travel,
while recycling and reusing important public resources.
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Complete Abolishment)
1. Photo Enforcement Alternatives

The National Motorist's Association ("NMA") is one of the
biggest supporters of ending government's reliance on photo
enforcement as a traffic safety measure.119 Particularly in the redlight camera context, the NMA identifies a host of options that
have proven to be extremely effective in reducing accidents caused
by red-light violations, including: (1) increasing yellow-light
time; 120 (2) adding a clearance interval (or a longer clearance
interval) after a light turns red; 121 (3) making traffic lights more
visible;122 (4) improving intersections for motorists; 123 and (5)
retiming traffic signals. 124
Additionally, there are alternatives to using cameras for
enforcing speed and toll violations, including mounted or stand119. See National Motorist Association, supra note 16 (stating that the
National Motorists Association opposes the use of cameras to issue tickets).
120. Id. The NMA cites two studies conducted by the Texas Transportation
Institute and the Virginia Department of Transportation finding that even a
"modestly longer yellow light" significantly decreases red-light violations and
accidents at intersections where in effect. Id. The NMA also cites research
refuting those against using longer yellow lights because drivers grow
accustomed to them. Id. Even if drivers grow accustomed to them, red-light
camera technology is subject to a similar critique.
121. Id. An all-red clearance interval, a period where the lights in all
directions at an intersection are red, has been found to be an effective way to
reduce traffic accidents caused by red-light violations. Id. The NMA cites a
project conducted by the Automobile Association of America ("AAA") of
Michigan and the city of Detroit for this proposition. Id. The project consisted
of implementing an all-red clearance interval, among other non-camera
techniques, at high-crash intersections in Detroit. Id. "During the first
twenty-seven months of the [project], crashes decreased by forty-seven percent
with a fifty percent reduction in injuries." Id. Red-light violations also
decreased by fifty percent during this period; no red-light cameras were
utilized to achieve these results. Id.
122. Id. This improvement was also made to the traffic lights at the highrisk intersections studied during the AAA of Michigan project identified above.
Id. AAA of Michigan, in conjunction with the City of Detroit made the actual
lenses of the traffic lights fifty percent larger so that they would be brighter
and more visible. Id. Other improvements to increase the visibility of traffic
lights themselves included removal of any obstructions (signs, trees, cameras)
that make the light difficult to see, and installing devices that eliminate glare
caused by the sun. Id.
123. Id. Some high-risk intersections are denominated as such as a result of
the dilapidated condition of the roadways. Id. Making expenditures to
improve signage, roadway pavement markers, and turn-lanes would not only
help maintain the character of the neighborhood, but, as indicated by the
above study, have profound effects on traffic safety and accident reduction. Id.
124. Id. Retiming traffic signals to reduce the number of red-lights that a
driver encounters during a trip will reduce red-light violations. Id. Retiming
traffic signals has also been found to reduce traffic congestion, travel time, gas
consumption, and road rage. Id.
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alone speed trailers, additional patrolling officers, installation of
speed humps, and increased expenditures on defensive-driving
education. The use of speed monitors, which utilize radar
technology to determine the speed of an approaching vehicle, and
then display that speed to the driver, have also been found to be
very effective in deterring speeding. 25
2. Additional ProceduralSafeguards for Existing Photo
Enforcement Statutes
It is likely that the government will continue to use photo
enforcement technology to enforce its traffic laws. In the
meantime, additional procedural safeguards should be in place to
ensure the fairness of the system to as many drivers as possible.
This includes, at a minimum, California-like notice requirements
that inform drivers that photo enforcement is used in the state.126
It also includes limiting the subject matter of the photographs
taken to minimize disclosures of potentially sensitive
information. 127 Further, photo enforcement systems should be
administered exclusively by the government to avoid any claims of
impropriety and to avoid situations where government actors
could be prone to mischief.128
Next, the "innocent owner" problem must be mitigated to the
extent possible under a photo enforcement process. This includes
providing the registered owner of a vehicle adequate opportunity
to contest liability through an "affidavit of non-responsibility" and
recognizing a wide array of acceptable excuses under the law,
including: "I wasn't driving." Finally, the system should not be set
up as a means by which to assess points or other criminal
penalties against the registered owner.
Jurisdictions contemplating enacting photo enforcement
programs should incorporate these safeguards, not only to protect
against the multitude of legal claims that accompany their use,

125. See id. (noting that the AAA conducted a study in 1995 which
established that photo enforcement technology has been no more effective than
speed trailers in reducing speed violations, and its use is far less costeffective).
126. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 21455.5(a)(1) (2008) (requiring that the
governmental agency "identify the system by signs that clearly indicate the
system's presence and are visible to traffic approaching from all directions, or
posts signs at all major entrances to the city, including, at a minimum,
freeways, bridges, and state highway routes").
127. Disclosure of photographs, tickets, and other information compiled
through the administration of a photo enforcement program should be limited
to exceptional situations in which the party requesting the documents shows
substantial need.
128. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 21455.5(c) (authorizing "only a governmental
agency, in cooperation with a law enforcement agency, [to operate] an
automated enforcement system").
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but also to ensure a measure of fairness in a law enforcement
device that is fundamentally unfair.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the number of legal challenges to photo enforcement,
courts thus far have been unwilling to intervene and invalidate
photo enforcement statutes. 129 Similarly, the legislatures
themselves have been, for the most part, unwilling to repeal photo
enforcement once implemented.13 0 Unless the proposed new
constitutional attack is successful, the preservation of
fundamental liberty rights must be procured the old-fashioned
way. That is, the voice of opposition must be brought to bear
against those who support laws which flout our most cherished
rights. Politicians must know that continued adherence to libertyrestricting laws do not only carry stark consequences for the
Constitution, but stark consequences for their re-election bids as
well.

129. This is a result of the deference given to the legislature, as long as it
satisfies rational basis review. Under the "levels of scrutiny" test, the
governing authority need only utter the words "public safety" in response to a
plaintiffs attempt to prove a less noble, but equally probable purpose for the
enactment of the law, and the government will win. See, e.g., Pennell v. City
of Sane Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (finding the safety and protection of
tenants by landlords to be a legitimate purpose when a city ordinance allowed
certain tenants to be treated differently than others); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 160, 175 (1980) (noting that social and economic laws will be
judged under the rational basis review test and will not be found to violate the
Constitution simply because they are imperfect, so long as there is some
reasonable basis for the statute); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528
(1959) (stating that it is not important for a state legislature to declare its
purpose, motive or policy behind enacting a certain law because under rational
basis, any legitimate interest will be upheld as constitutional); Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (holding that the proper avenue to
contest a new law is not the courts, but through the legislature since it is not
unconstitutional under rational basis review); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (stating that a court will not overturn a
statute that does not burden a suspect class or a fundamental interest, unless
it fails the very deferential standard of rational-basis review). This is the case
in almost every case construing a photo enforcement statute under the
Constitution. See, e.g., Idris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933, at *19 (rejecting the
plaintiff's substantive due process claim because he was unable to rebut the
presumption of validity with which the courts review statutes under rationalbasis review). This will change if courts agree that such statutes impinge
upon fundamental rights.
130. This is a result of the less noble purpose for the enactment of photo
enforcement law: money. See Shannon, supra note 4, at 613 (arguing that
"while camera proponents often tout the safety benefits of cameras, the
evidence strongly suggests that many municipalities use them to generate
revenue").

